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Introduction
Privacy in the workplace has for many years been a contested concept, with traditional ideas
that a worker cedes personal autonomy and rights as a natural consequence of entering the
employment sphere,2 coming into conflict with more modern ideas, especially in Europe, that
workers remain humans with rights, albeit possibly limited, in the workplace, and that in the
long-hours culture that now rules many workplaces, a degree of sympathy for private life and
self-fulfilment  must  be  retained.3 At  a  time  of  expanding  state  and  private  sector
surveillance,4 the modern workplace has also become a key site of surveillance technologies,
with ever cheaper monitoring tools used pervasively, including audio and video surveillance,
interception of calls, e-mails and web traffic, and more recently “smart” tagging of workers’
desks,  cars,  lapel  badges,  door  passes,  phones  et  al  to  measure  location,  activity  and
productivity;  and algorithmic  profiling  to  derive  intelligence  feeding into,  and sometimes
altogether  determining  without  human  input,  hiring,  firing  and  promotion  decisions.
Employee  surveillance  long  precedes  technological  innovation,  of  course.  Human
surveillance of the direct kind, unmediated by technology (for example, shop floor or factory
managers patrolling by eye) still occurs in contemporary society, although it is often now
combined with technological tools. Information technology has transformed the nature and
extent of surveillance at work by affording employers with remarkable monitoring abilities
which go beyond the localised workplace to extend to the home and social environment, and
pervasively surveille not just conventional work hours but 24/7.5 In our work we trace the
history of employee surveillance at work through the lens of dominant technologies of each
era. A novel five-phase model of surveillance is proposed: 
 Surveillance 1.0 - physical and analogue surveillance; 
 Surveillance 2.0 - databases and dossiers; 
 Surveillance 3.0 - digital networked technologies; 
1 Respectively, Professor of E-Governance, Law School, University of Strathclyde; Doctoral candidate, Law 
School, University of Strathclyde; Senior Lecturer, School of Computer Science, University of St Andrews.
2 See Kahn-Freud, O. ‘The Legal Framework’ in Hardy, S.T. Labour Law in Great Britain, Fifth Revised 
Edition (England: Kluwer Law International: 2012)
3 Niemietz v Germany [1992] ECHR 80
4 For an overview and some insights into state surveillance after the Snowden revelations, and surveillance in the
private sector by social media, retail, marketing and Internet industries, L Edwards Law, Policy and the Internet 
(2018, Hart Publishing) chs 5-7.
5 Ball, K. ‘Workplace Surveillance: An Overview’ (2010) Labor History, 51(1), pp87-106
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 Surveillance 4.0 - connected smart devices and the Internet of Things; 
 Surveillance 5.0 - big data and algorithmic profiling and classification 
Regulation has responded to, or is in the process of responding to, the technologies in each of
these  phases  and  their  effects  on  worker  and  workplace  privacy,  albeit  sometimes  more
slowly than is desirable. The right to respect for private life has been asserted as applicable to
the  workplace  in  a  series  of  Strasbourg  cases  beginning  in  1992.6 However,  employee
surveillance, as in so many areas of technology, at the moment outpaces law, and algorithmic
profiling of the workplace in particular is so far an understudied area where worker rights are
coming under potential threat. This is particularly true in the so-called “gig” economy, where
typically systematic use of precarious “zero hour” contracts not awarding full employment
rights, has intersected with ever closer micro-surveillance, assisted often by use of “smart” or
“Internet  of  Things”  technologies  (think  Amazon’s  workers,  speed  tested  as  they  move
around warehouses, or Uber’s drivers,  remotely monitored by the location data  their  cars
collect  along  routes  and  the  ratings  their  passengers  give  them.)  In  short,  workplace
surveillance has become a perfect storm of convergence of surveillance technologies with
results that are under-anticipated by regulation and, via scope creep, have the potential to
seriously impair the rights of employees. While our five-phase model is a step forward in
analysing the rise of automated workplace surveillance,  what also became noticeable in our
research is that earlier technologies can be co-opted into newer models of surveillance, with
results that are under-anticipated by regulation and, via scope creep, have the potential to
seriously impair the rights of workers.
Accordingly, we present a fortuitous case study with which two of the authors have been
closely involved. The academic (UCU) strike action in the UK in 2017-2018 threw up a
highly combative environment where some universities reportedly considered or attempted to
“strike  break”  by  replacing,  without  new permission  or  consent,  striking  academics  with
recordings of their lectures made in previous years. These recordings were usually made for
laudable  motivations  such  as  widening  access  and  allowing  students  to  revise.  On
examination,  this  practice  of  mandated  lecture  capture,  unchallenged  when  used  to  help
students but now under examination when its use is transformed, is often of dubious legality,
both with reference to copyright7 and data protection, as well as overarching privacy rights
and the relationship of trust and confidence between employee and employer. Furthermore,
6 Niemietz, sura n 3
7 In this paper, we concentrate on the privacy and surveillance dimensions, though the copyright issues are 
certainly worthy of future work.
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evidence is emerging that some universities are without publicity using lecture capture as a
surveillance mechanism to grade or intimidate academics, or as a means to covertly replace
them entirely.  Serendipitously  a  recent  European Court  of  Human Rights  (ECtHR) case,
Antović and Mirković v Montenegro8 provides some ammunition with which to dispute these
transformative and unsettling re-uses of recorded lectures. 
Finally, we consider the negative consequences of such non-permissioned re-use, which may
include  not  just  breach  of  trust  placed  in  university  management  by  academics,  but
withdrawal from positive uses of lecture capture such as widening participation and enabling
access, as well as loss of trust by students in their university management. We make some
recommendations, including that lectures should never be recorded without explicit consent
to processing of personal data and that recorded lectures should never be re-used for non-core
educational  purposes  without  explicit  consent.  Ideally  these  recommendations  would  be
incorporated  into  guidance  such  as  the  recently  revised  JISC  guidance  for  universities.
Finally we consider if the UCU strike case study has wider implications for the evolution of
surveillance in the wider world beyond academe.
A history of workplace surveillance and technology; the five phase model 
Surveillance 1.0: analogue world
Physical oversight and analogue recording of employee activity exemplify Surveillance 1.0;
the  first  foundational  phase  of  employee  surveillance.  Business  historians  report  that
extensive monitoring of the workforce was adopted as a means of control in early 20th century
manufacturing  factories.9 The ‘panoptic’  physical  architecture  of the workplace permitted
extensive and intensive visual oversight of workers undertaking their duties.10 Foucault notes
that “by walking up and down the central aisle of the workshop, it was possible to carry out a
supervision  that  was both general  and individual”.11 In  the latter  half  of the  20th century
employers’ physical surveillance capabilities were supplemented by management theory and
testing  techniques.  Fredrick  Taylor’s  Principles  of  Scientific  Management12 attempted  to
8 Application no. 70838/13, 28 November 2017; [2017] ECHR 365.
9 Landes, D. ‘The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe
from 1750 to the Present’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)
10 See Bentham’s infamous 18th century panopticon prison design. Bentham, J. ‘An Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation’ (1780) Reprinted by Dover Philosophical Classics (NY: Dover Publications Inc, 
2007)
11 Foucault, M. ‘Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison’ translated by Sheridan, A. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1991)
12  Taylor, F.W. ‘The Principles of Scientific Management’ (NY: Harper & Bros, 1911) {WWW Document} 
http://public-library.uk/pdfs/8/917.pdf (visited 14 July 2018) 
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improve  workforce  efficiency  by  enabling  high  levels  of  managerial  control  over  the
employee  in  the  course  of  his  working  duties.  Fragmentation  of  tasks,  close  visual
observation and timing of every aspect of job execution were undertaken in order to assign
employees to the most suitable tasks and to allow employers to specify “not only what is to
be done but how it is to be done and the exact time allowed for doing it”.13 Furthermore,
surveillance  techniques  began  to  dominate  selection,  promotion  and  firing  as  employers
adopted psychological, genetic and physical testing in attempts to uncover employee ability
and aptitude. 
Surveillance 2.0: database nation
By the late 1970’s policymakers were exhibiting significant concern about Surveillance 2.0,
involving  computer  automation,  digitisation  of  files  and  the  creation  of  data  banks.14
Surveillance  had  become  built  into  the  infrastructure  of  the  workplace  as  computers
continuously  generated,  captured  and  processed  data  on  a  scale  unprecedented  in  the
analogue era. Intensive digital monitoring could now be undertaken as it was possible to track
the employees’ every interaction with computer equipment and software. Recording of inter
alia keyboard  activity,  application  usage  and  mouse  clicks  provided  employers  with
comprehensive  overviews  and  intensive  insight  into  employee  activity.  One  of  the  most
profound  aspects  of  computerisation,  however,  is  the  employer’s  ability  to  engage  in
‘surveillance  through  database’.  The  database  allows  for  data  to  be  compiled,  tabulated,
sifted, and cross-referenced instantaneously and more accurately than paper-based analogue
techniques. The database presents data in a manner apt for analysis affording employers with
extensive  oversights,  the  ability  to  undertake  systematic  investigation  and comparison of
workforce performance whilst  being able  to uncover individual  tendencies,  characteristics
and behaviours. Sharing of databases allows for the construction of detailed profiles on the
individual and grants employers insights into the lifestyles of employees,  something fully
exploited later in phase 5.0.15 With computerisation, data can be ‘mined’ in limitless numbers
of useful ways to reveal patterns and produce actionable information. 
Surveillance 3.0: the Internet and interception of communications
13  ibid., Chapter 2 
14  For an overview of UK and European policy discussions on the matter see Kosta, E. ‘Consent in European 
Data Protection Law’ (Leiden: M.Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) ch 2; for a US perspective on the rise of private and
public database keeping, see D Solove ‘The Digital Person’, (NYU Press, 2004) ch 1.
15 See Garfinkel, S. ‘Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century (Cambridge: O’Reilly, 2000) and
Lyon, D. ‘Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk and Digital Discrimination’ (London: Routledge, 2003)
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From the mid-90s on, the Internet, as it became a vital tool for work, enabled a new type of
surveillance via the interception of worker communications. This Surveillance 3.0 allowed
employers,  at  a  distance  and  with  minimal  effort,  to  track  employees’  entire  work  and
sometimes  home  life  via  their  calls  made,  e-mails  sent  and  online  sites  visited.  The
integration of the Internet into the workplace and its unauthorised use by employees at work
presents justifiable concerns to employers in terms of fears of slacking, misuse and illegal
behaviour  for  which  the employer  might  be liable  (eg  downloading of  obscene  material,
defamation  of  others)  and  as  a  result  software  enabling  real-time  recording  of
communications and online activities became standard. Crucially though, many employers
can thus now gain insight via communications and browsing histories into not just the labour
of their workforce, but also their personal relationships, thoughts, opinions, preferences and
interactions.16 Employers can also gain unprecedented insight into the lifestyles and non-work
activities  of employees  through identifying  inter alia social  media accounts  and personal
blogs,  and  sometimes,  demanding  password  access  to  these.17 As  our  online  lives  have
become  arguably  as  important  as  our  offline  ones,  these  developments  have  severely
prejudiced not just worker but personal privacy and may also affect the friends and family of
workers.
Surveillance 4.0: smart tech, ubiquitous computing and the Internet of Workers
Although surveillance of the worker in the real world has always been possible (see phase
1.0),  it  was limited by practical  constraints.  Every worker could not easily  be physically
monitored  by  humans  all  day  and  not  at  all  outside  the  physical  work  area.  Workers
inevitably  outnumbered  supervisors,  Bentham’s  Panopticon  not  being  generally  a  real
architectural  phenomenon.  Pervasive  information  technologies  such  as  CCTV  and  RFID
tracking began to make inroads into this uneven power balance as early as the 1970s (CCTV)
and  1990s  (RFID)  and  became,  the  former  especially,  standard  parts  of  employee
surveillance. However, these technologies have now been subsumed within and extended by
a more powerful wave of real world surveillance technologies: the Internet of Things (IoT).18
16 ECtHR cases have revealed the extent of insights employers have gained through this type of surveillance. For
example, see Copland v The United Kingdom [2007] ECHR 253 and Barbulescu v Romania [2017] ECHR 754. 
17 In the UK the ICO has warned that such a practice might be a breach of data protection rights, whereas it is 
relatively common in the US: see “Employers warned against demanding Facebook details from staff”, 
Guardian, 26 March 2012 at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/mar/26/employers-warned-
facebook-login-details .
18 There are inconsistencies and confusion over the definition of the IoT. See Manwaring, K., Clarke, R. ‘Surfing
the  third  wave  of  computing:  a  framework  for  research  into  eObjects’ (2015)  Computer  Law & Security
Review: The International Journal of Technology Law and Practice, 31(5), pp586-603. See discussion of the
impact of the IoT generally on user privacy in L Edwards “Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart
Cities: A Critical EU Law Perspective “(2016) 2 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 28. For the purposes of this paper the
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Surveillance  4.0  relates  to  the  real-time,  ubiquitous  and  unobtrusive  surveillance  of
employees  made  possible  by  small  cheap  sensor  technology  capable  of  being  embedded
within the working environment, everyday objects and even the human body. The nature of
IoT devices (whether worn or embedded within the environment) allows for intimate 24/7
tracking which gathers data on the everyday reality of employees.19 Richards notes that with
the IoT in the workplace “more and more previously unobservable activity (is subject) to
electronic measurement, observation and control”.20 Biological, psychological and emotional
surveillance are also facilitated through application of the IoT to the workplace. Interaction
with the IoT becomes unavoidable, and often cannot be left at home (especially given the
portability of most electronic devices these days, the expectation of employees to be allowed
to “Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)”21 and the dual use of eg taxis at  work and home)
granting employers real-time insights into employees most intimate moments as well as work
activities. 
Surveillance 5.0: the age of algorithms
Machine learning (ML) algorithms (often, wrongly, described as “AI”) are increasingly being
applied to “big data” generated by Surveillance 1.0 to 4.0 (and by other industries such as
retail, marketing or social media) to enable further surveillance of the worker. Data analytics
algorithms  are  designed  to  generally  spot  patterns  in  large  amounts  of  data,  enabling
categorisation and profiling. Applied to the labour market, this enables automated or assisted
decision  making  about  hiring,  firing  and  internal  promotion  or  disciplining.  Through
algorithmic analysis of big datasets, employers can identify behaviours of interest, uncover
emotional states, expose unshared personal preferences and even create new knowledge. For
example,  lip-reading  and  facial-recognition  algorithms  applied  to  CCTV  recordings  can
provide employers with full transcripts of employees’ private conversations.22 Uses of such
algorithms are mushrooming as costs fall and data grow. At a most basic level around 90% of
workplaces have admitted using Google and social media sites to research a job candidate -
IoT  relates  to  computer  processors  and  networks  of  sensors  capable  of  data  collection,  processing  and
communication and embedded within everyday objects, the physical architecture of the workplace and even the
human body allowing for the real-time transmission of data to employers.
19 A29WP note that the IoT allows for the tracking of “an individual’s even more detailed and complete life and
behaviour patterns”. See A29WP, Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent Developments on the Internet of Things, WP
223, p8.
20 Richards, N.M. ‘The Dangers of Surveillance’ (2013) Harvard Law Review, Vol126, 1934-1964, p1940
21 Weeger, A., Wang, X., & Gewald, H. (2016). 'IT consumerization: BYOD-program acceptance and its impact 
on employer attractiveness' Journal of Computer Information Systems, 56(1), pp1-10.
22 See M Veale and L Edwards, “Better seen and not (over) heard? Automated lipreading systems and privacy in 
public places”, EU PLSC, Brussels, January 2018.
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something which has been banned in Germany23 – while at  a more sophisticated level,  a
number of  firms  now offer  services  to  profile  potential  or  actual  employees  using  every
known  piece  of  human  resources,  performance  and  appraisal  data,  every  internal
communication  or  web  search,  customer  feedback  or  rating,  enhanced  intelligence  from
CCTV (eg emotional  information)  and external  data such as social  media posts or police
reports.24 Algorithms are  parasitic  on  all  the  preceding surveillance  phases,  but  add new
elements of claimed predictiveness which may be confused with actuality, along with dangers
of bias, error and discrimination, unfairness and lack of transparency which makes them hard
to  challenge;  these  features  are  now well  documented.25 As  such they  may be  the  most
dangerous technology yet in the ongoing land-grab for employee privacy.
Lecture capture and repurposing as surveillance: our case study
As  the  last  section  showed,  technology  now  affords  employers  with  arguably  greater
surveillance capabilities than at any time in industrial history. Privacy in the workplace, a
value  recognised  explicitly  by  the  ECtHR,  is  under  severe  threat.  Surveillance  extends
beyond the workplace to home and socialising environments, and can be pervasive and 24/7,
rather than restricted to constrained working hours and clearly defined work tasks. Every
aspect of worker behaviour including location, productivity, attitude and conversations can
now be gathered and analysed in “smart”  surveilled or intercepted environments  or from
sources such as social media. Positive behaviour (eg fitness) may be mandated,26 as well as
negative behaviours (eg slacking, theft) reduced. The incursion into private life both in and
outside work is profound as well as the private life of friends, families and contacts). Most
worryingly perhaps, job acquisition, security and progression may in future be determined
wholly or partially by automated algorithmic systems whose frailty in relation to fairness,
transparency and accountability27 is now well  recorded. Despite the phase model outlined
23 Germany has banned employers from searching job candidates on social networks used for electronic 
communication, except where the site exists to represent the professional qualifications of members. German 
employers can use search engines and sites such as Linkedin but are forbidden from looking up candidates on 
Facebook and Twitter. 
24 For example, See https://www.sterlingtalentsolutions.co.uk/ and 
https://www.veroscreening.com/services/employment-screening/ 
25 See eg Edwards, L. and Veale, M. “ Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'Right to an Explanation' Is Probably Not 
the Remedy You Are Looking For” 16 Duke Law & Technology Review 18 (2017).
26 For a discussion of employee surveillance and wellness programmes in the US legal context, see Ajunwa, I., 
Crawford, K., & Schultz, J. (2017). “Limitless worker surveillance.” California Law Review, 105(3), pp735-
776.
27 There has been a large amount of interest in fairness, accountability and transparency for algorithmic decision-
making in recent years, as evidenced by the creation of the FAT ML and FAT* stream of conferences – see 
https://www.fatml.org/. For a general overview of some of the issues, see Kroll, J. A., Huey, J., Barocas, S., 
Felten, E. W., Reidenberg, J. R., Robinson, D. G., & Yu, H. (2017). Accountable algorithms. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 165(3), pp633-705; Lepri, B., Oliver, N., Letouzé, E., Pentland, A., & Vinck, P. 
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above, the world is sometimes more complex than consecutive. Older technologies may be
co-opted into later phases of surveillance; indeed as we have already noted, datasets gathered
via phases 1-4 can be used in wholly unexpected ways in phase 5, algorithmic profiling.
Workplaces may now conceivably use a mix of (say) manual supervision, smart tagged work
lanyards  or  badges,  e-mail  and  web  traffic  interception,  tracking  of  work  laptops  and
smartphones used at home, algorithmic assessment and social media scrutiny to produce an
all-encompassing Panopticon. 
An  interesting  phenomenon  here  is  “function  creep”  –  used  here  to  mean  the  use  of
technologies  for  purposes  for  which  they  were  not  originally  designed  or  envisaged  by
employers.28 For example, CCTV may once have been installed in a workplace simply to
establish the presence of employers, and perhaps to reduce criminal activity such as pilfering,
or to discourage non-productive employees from slacking; however now in Surveillance 5.0,
facial and emotion recognition techniques applied to video footage might be used to establish
characteristics  such  as  enthusiasm  or  commitment.29 CCTV  or  video  surveillance  is
particularly prone to such repurposing or “added value” processing; in recent months, the use
of face recognition in workplaces has become particularly controversial,30and emotional or
“affective”  computing,  is  probably  the  next  scandal  waiting  to  happen.  Repurposing  of
technological surveillance may thus increase the already heavy incursion into the private lives
of employees and may be unpredictable – did employees expect standard video recording to
reveal our conversations? No31- and hence this becomes harder to guard against.
The case study
This paper was inspired by a fortuitous “natural experiment” which offers an opportunity to
study  scope  creep  in  relation  to  video  capture,  and  its  transformation  into  employee
surveillance technology. In the spring of 2018, academics at 66 UK universities, who were
part of the union UCU (University and College Union), embarked on strike action in response
(2017). Fair, transparent, and accountable algorithmic decision-making processes. Philosophy & Technology; 
Kirkpatrick, K. (2016). Battling algorithmic bias: How do we ensure algorithms treat us fairly? Communications
of the ACM, 59(10), pp16-17.
28 See also science fiction writer William Gibson’s famous aphorism: “the street finds its uses for things”.
29 See McStay, A. ‘Emotional AI: The Rise of Empathic Media’ (Sage, 2018).
30 See outcry at Amazon’s use of a facial recognition system known as Rekognition: eg “Amazon face 
recognition falsely matches 28 lawmakers with mugshots, ACLU says”, Guardian, 26 July 2018 at 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/26/amazon-facial-rekognition-congress-mugshots-aclu ; and 
Microsoft’s unusually strong call for regulation of face recognition at https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
issues/2018/07/13/facial-recognition-technology-the-need-for-public-regulation-and-corporate-responsibility/, 
13 July 2018.
31 See discussion of how machine learning algorithms can now reconstruct conversations from video recordings 
at a distance , supra n 22.
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to an attempt to protest cuts in pension rights by management.32 The strike action created a
highly  combative  environment,  and  one  of  the  outcomes  was  that  some  universities
threatened to “break” the strike by replacing, without new permission or consent, striking
academics with recordings of their lectures made in previous years. These recordings had
been made usually for laudable, but very different, motivations such as widening access to off
campus or disabled students and allowing students access to recordings to revise classes.
Such  systems  of  “lecture  capture”  have  become  widespread  in  the  UK,  but  practice
surrounding  them  eg  whether  recording  is  voluntary  or  mandatory  and  what  release  or
permission is obtained from lecturers is, as we will discuss below, highly disparate. These
threats were widely circulated on social media and created some alarm. One reason for this
was that some universities had already indicated prior to the strike, either via express policies
or via practice or statements, that they did use or might consider using recorded lectures to
assess  the  performance  of  lecturers  as  well  as  use  them  as  a  resource  for  students.33
Effectively this constitutes a type of surveillance, possibly also without notice to the lecturers
concerned of the intended purpose (which might be seen as covert surveillance – see below)
and possibly  without  an opportunity  to  opt  out.  Such surveillance  could also be  seen as
impinging on the ability to do their job to the best of their ability; a lecture given to inform
students and awaken debate, is not the same as one given expecting a score or a demerit. Our
hypothesis is that the combative environment of the strike thus provided a textbook example
of how an innocent and indeed socially positive data collection practice could be abused. An
obvious  fear  would  be  that  having  seen  the  potential  for  re-use  of  lecture  capture,  the
performance  surveillance  model  might  become  more  widespread,  and  become  routine
supplementary  material  in  eg  appraisals  or  disciplinary  proceedings.  (It  should  be  noted
perhaps that “student satisfaction” with lecturers in the UK is an important factor which is
assessed  by  questionnaires,  figured  into  league  tables  and  affects  the  state  funding  a
university, and individual departments within it, receive. “Excellence in teaching” as a metric
has  furthermore  been  reinforced  as  a  funding  and  league  table  issue  in  England  by  the
Teaching Excellence Framework or TEF. Put perhaps a little provocatively, surveillance of
teaching  quality  in  England  and  Wales  can  be  seen  as  akin  to  CCTV  surveillance  of
workplaces like Amazon to ensure productivity, something which has generally been seen as
32 See https://www.ucu.org.uk/strikeforuss .
33 See eg the St Andrews lecture capture policy https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/proctor/documents/lecture-
capture-policy.pdf which states that “3.9 Recordings will not be used to monitor staff performance other than in 
the circumstances covered by 3.11” and “3.11 the University reserves the right to consult recordings in formal 
disciplinary and complaint proceedings”.
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antithetical to an academic environment where lecturers have historically been seen as having
some  degree  of  collegiate  organisation  and  autonomy  as  part  of  academic  freedom  and
professional respect, rather than working under strict managerial control. 
A key question is how the knowledge of surveillance might affect academic freedom. What
effect does surveillance have on the ability of lecturers to teach freely and to lead students
into  controversial  and  perhaps  challenging  debates?  There  is  already  evidence  that  the
knowledge of  state surveillance can exert a “chilling effect” over writers and artists.34 The
authors, who were either union members and supporters of the strike, or affected by the strike
(Martin) took the view that it was important to investigate if the law allowed this reuse of
recorded lectures  without  consent  for purposes such as not  only strike breaking but  also
performance  assessment.  We  undertook  an  informal  survey  in  an  attempt  to  gather
information about lecture capture from the 61 higher education institutions involved in the
UCU  strike  (the  “policy  survey”,  available  online,35 redacted  in  some  cases  to  protect
anonymity). Data were gathered firstly by searching individual institutions’ web sites for a
lecture capture policy, and additional data were gathered through a web-based survey and
advertisements  on social  media.  Although the survey did not aim to be methodologically
robust it obtained a result for a large majority of institutions, even though this was sometimes
a null result – ie no policy or data available. We found that of these 61 institutions, 40 had a
lecture capture system ie they recorded audio or video of lectures and made them accessible
to students.  Policies  relating  to  such systems were found for  28 institutions.  15 of  those
policies  were  “opt-out” – ie,  a  lecturer  would have to  make a  positive  choice  not  to  be
recorded. Policies varied a great deal, both in specificity and in content: the two major legal
domains identified as relevant were copyright and data protection. We draw on these findings
below.
The survey results along with legal advice were aired at a well-attended interactive session
organised at BILETA, the UK’s largest national IT law conference,  in Aberdeen in April
2018.36 As  outcomes,  Henderson  and  Edwards,  alongside  Prof  Abbe  Brown,  Head  of
Department at Aberdeen Law School and the chair of the conference, were tasked to assist
Andrew Cormack of JISC in updating the existing JISC guidance to academic institutions on
lecture capture. The revised version went live on 19 June 2018 and was reportedly the most
34 See PENAmerica survey Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives U.S. Writers to Self-Censor (2013) at 
https://pen.org/sites/default/files/Chilling%20Effects_PEN%20American.pdf which found that 1 in 6 US writers
surveyed had self-censored in terms of speaking or writing about topics they thought be under surveillance.
35 Henderson, T (2018), Lecture capture survey. Figshare dataset https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.6973847
36 See http://bileta.ac.uk/News/&action=fullnews&id=32 .
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clicked on page on the JISC site in early July.37 BILETA guidance relating to lecture capture
is also in the process of being drafted.
Regulation 
General themes
As recently as 1999, Craig reviewed the issue of employee privacy and the legality of human
resource policies (many of which mandated surveillance) and concluded that there was “no
identifiable law of workplace privacy in the United Kingdom”.38 However, a seismic change
in the legal landscape was about to happen that would “make it possible for a comprehensive
body of workplace privacy law to emerge.”39 The European Data Protection Directive (DPD)
199540 (and the domestic Data Protection Act (DPA) 199841), the incorporation of the ECHR
into domestic law42 and new domestic legislation on the interception of communications43
were all identified as having potential to give rise a right to privacy at work. Some work on
these regimes and their  effects  on employee privacy has been undertaken,44 but employee
surveillance remains the Cinderella sister of surveillance studies: neither as outright shocking
to citizens as state surveillance in the pose Snowden era, nor as ubiquitously discussed as
consumer targeting and profiling in the “surveillance capitalism”45 ecology of social media,
search and e-commerce platforms like Google, Facebook, Amazon et al. 
Legal  regulation  has  since  struggled  to  keep  pace  with  significant  technological
developments delineating the nature of scope of surveillance at work. Each time that one area
has seemed to become to some extent regulated – interception of worker calls and e-mails,
CCTV capture of employees - another has emerged as an unclear and only fuzzily regulated
invasion of workplace privacy – “smart” surveillance,  algorithmic profiling. Policymakers
and courts have attempted to respond to these new challenges but as noted before, tend to lag
37 See https://www.jisc.ac.uk/guides/recording-lectures-legal-considerations ; and private e-mail from Andrew 
Cormack, 30 July 2018.
38 Craig, J. ‘Privacy & Employment Law’ (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999)
39 ibid.,  p4. See also Jeffrey,  M.  ‘Information Technology and Workers’  Privacy:  The English Law’ (2002)
Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal, 32, pp301-350
40 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
41 The Data Protection Act 1998 Chpt 29. 
42 In the form of the Human Rights Act 1998 Chpt 42. 
43 The Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications) Regulations 2000,
No.2699 (made under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).
44 See inter alia n5, n37 and Jeffrey, M. ‘Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: The English Law’ 
(2002) Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal, 32, pp301-350
45 Zuboff, S. (2015). Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization. Journal 
of Information Technology, 30(1), pp75-89
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behind technological development. A series of recent ECtHR cases have however attempted
to create some principled responses to the issue of surveillance at work although even these
are less fully and systematically argued than might have been hoped. This section grounds the
enquiry into the regulation of lecture capture by introducing the laws currently regulating
employee surveillance and then applying them to the case study.
Data Protection
The General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR)46 replaces the existing regime building
upon  the  existing  20  years  of  data  protection  legislation  and  case  law.  The  UK  has
implemented the GDPR in the form of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018).47 Data
protection (DP) law has undergone significant reformation with the GDPR modernising rules
and standards for the modern digital economy, and introducing new provisions with potential
to rein in employee surveillance. Further reform is also imminent with the rules on privacy in
electronic  communications  under  review.48The GDPR is  billed  as  affording data  subjects
greater  control  through  the  strengthened  threshold  condition  of  consent.49 Workplace
surveillance inevitably involves collection and processing of personal data and historically
consent has often been obtained to it as part of the employment contract or as a separate
permission. Yet since the GDPR, prima facie consent to data processing in the employment
context appears to be unattainable given the significant imbalances in power which are of the
essence of the employment relation.50 The GDPR introduces explicit provisions suggesting
that consent will be invalid in the employment context as not “freely given”.51 As consent can
no longer legitimise data processing in an employee surveillance situation, other threshold
conditions may require scrutiny, in particular that processing is necessary for the performance
of  a  contract52 or  that  it  is  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  the  legitimate  interests  of  the
employer.53 Furthermore,  Article  88 GDPR introduces  novel  provisions allowing member
46 Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC.
47 The Data Protection Act 2018 Chpt 12. 
48 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for 
private life and protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC 
(Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications) COM(2017) 10 final 
49 Consent is defined under Article 4(11) and Article 7 GDPR. It is one, though not the only, grounds for lawful 
processing of personal data under Article 6 GDPR. 
50 
51  Recital 43 and Article 7 GDPR. Pre-GDPR the A29WP strongly suggested that consent in the employment 
context would not be valid. See A29WP, Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment 
context, WP48 and A29WP, Working Document 2002 on the surveillance of electronic communications at 
work, WP55.
52 Art 6(1)(b) GDPR.
53 Unless these interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights or freedoms of the data subject. Art
6(1)(f) GDPR.
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states to enact “more specific rules to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms in
respect of the processing of employees’ personal data in the employment context”.54 Member
states  can  introduce  specific  measures  to  safeguard  the  employee’s  “human  dignity,
legitimate interests and fundamental right, with particular regard to…monitoring systems at
the workplace”.55 
Interception of communications
The UK has recently reformed their laws on interception of communications56 and this has
led to reissuing of the laws on workplace surveillance methods such as monitoring employee
calls, e-mails and website visits. The Investigatory Powers (Interception by Businesses Etc.
for Monitoring and Record-Keeping Purposes) Regulations 2018,57 otherwise known as the
Lawful Business Regulations, now permit the interception of employee communications. The
previous Lawful Business Regulations enacted under RIPA2000 had been regarded as highly
permissive,58 and the new rules do not seem any narrower. Notably, it is still possible for an
employer to lawfully intercept the communications (e-mails, calls, web traffic) of employees
while using a system provided by work predominantly for work purposes for a wide range of
reasons including “in order to establish the existence of facts”, without obtaining consent,
although notice is required and a record of the interception must be kept.59 
Privacy as a human right
Since 1992 there has been human rights scrutiny of worker surveillance in the Strasbourg
Court. Article 8 ECHR reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
54 Art 88(1) GDPR.
55 Art 88(2) GDPR. So far the only EU state to take advantage of this provision has been Germany.
56 Workplace interception of communications was previously regulated by statutory instrument (SI) made under 
RIPA 2000. With the replacement of that Act by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 it was also necessary to re 
enact the subsidiary legislation enabling workplace interception (see n52 infra), 
57 The Investigatory Powers (Interception by Businesses Etc. for Monitoring and Record-Keeping Purposes) 
Regulations 2018 No.356
58 See supra n 42
59 Supra n 56, r 3(2)(a), r 4(1)(a) (b) and (c). Other grounds are also listed in r 3 but the breadth of r 3(2)(a) 
seems to render them nugatory.
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or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The binary  structure  and qualified  nature  of  Article  8  allows  for  a  balance  to  be struck
between workers’ fundamental right to privacy60 with the legitimate interests of employers
(private and public sector – see below) in surveillance at work. First, the ECHR will consider
whether Article 8 is engaged in the particular circumstances of surveillance. Over the years,
the Courts  have determined that a wide array of surveillance technologies  fall  within the
overlapping yet  autonomous domains  compromising  Article  8(1).61 Significant  reliance  is
placed upon employees’ ‘reasonable expectations’ of privacy in determining whether Article
8  is  infringed,  creating  the  possibility  of  privacy  protection  being  dependent  upon
employment  status  or  the  nature  of  work  (permanent,  contractor,  casual  labour?).As  the
fundamental right to privacy is not an absolute right, the Courts will then consider if the
alleged interference by the state is justified under the conditions of Article 8(2). Public sector
employees may complain that their employer as an organ of the state has directly interfered
with  their  Article  8  right.62 The  state  is  also  required  to  take  steps  to  prevent  citizens
experiencing breaches of Article 8 in private relations (positive obligations).63 Thus, private
sector employees may claim that the state has failed to adequately safeguard or provide a
legal remedy for invasion of privacy by their employer  .64 It is crucial that the binary structure
of  Article  8  is  respected  so  that  employees’  right  to  privacy is  not  unduly  restricted  by
competing interests and that the onus is placed on states to justify interference, accounting for
their action or inaction.65 In 1992 the ECtHR in Niemietz v Germany66 clearly established the
prima  facie  right  to  privacy  at  work  stating  that:  “There  appears...to  be  no  reason  of
principle  why this  understanding of the notion of private  life  should be taken to exclude
activities of  a professional or business nature since it  is,  after all,  in the course of their
working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest opportunity of
developing  relationships  with  the  outside  world”.67 Through  Article  8  jurisprudence  the
60 The terms ‘privacy’ and ‘private life’ are not interchangeable. For the difference see González Fuster, G. ‘The
Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU’(Cham: Springer, 2014), p82-84
61 These are ‘private life’, ‘family life’, ‘home’, and ‘correspondence’.
62 This would constitute a breach of negative obligations.
63 There are different ways of ensuring respect for privacy and the nature of the State’s positive obligations will 
depend on the aspect of private life at stake. See Söderman v. Sweden [2013] ECHR no. 5786/08, at 79. 
64 Contracting States may fail in positive obligations by failing to adopt legislative measures or to conduct 
effective investigations into violations of fundamental rights.
65 Leijten, I. ‘Defining the Scope of Economic and Social Guarantees in Case Law of the ECHR’ in Shaping 
Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human 
Rights, Brems, E. & Gerards, J. (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2013) p109-136. 
66 Supra n 3.
67 ibid., at 29 
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Courts  have  incrementally  addressed  the  privacy  implications  of  workplace  surveillance
technologies.68 The ECtHR note that the Convention is a ‘living instrument’ and “must be
interpreted  in  light  of  present-day  conditions”.69 Article  8  is  not  afforded  an  exhaustive
definition and is fully adaptable to changing conditions of modern day society, thus being
capable  of  addressing  challenges  brought  by  new  technologies  and  changing  social
relationships.70 Recently significant Article 8 scrutiny of digital era employee surveillance
has  taken  place  bringing  into  question  the  ability  of  Article  8  to  regulate  and  uphold
employee  privacy  in  modern  day  working  environments.  In  particular,  a  recent  decision
concerning the legality of video recording of university auditoria has provided ammunition to
dispute the use of lecture capture technology (especially for the purposes of strike breaking)
in UK universities.71
Our  case  study:  Is  use  of  recorded  lectures  for  a  new  purpose  against  the  will  of
employees legitimate?
Data protection (DP) law
In the UK, the use of video surveillance in general, not just in the workplace, has often not
required the consent of those surveilled. Under the DPD, matters related to law enforcement
were excluded from the general ambit of data protection law, and as a result also in the UK
implementation of these laws in the DPA 1998. Where CCTV was used to detect or prevent
the commission of crime, as was often asserted, there was no need to provide a lawful ground
for processing of that data,  such as consent.72 CCTV became used extensively by private
shops, businesses and domestic users to safeguard and record activity around their premises,
without seeking permission, and this was lawful if the criminal purposes claim was made,
with only notice required. Furthermore domestic householders using CCTV to surveille their
own property were also exempted from the DP regime by the household or domestic purposes
exemption.73 There was no specific regulator for CCTV operations in the UK, whether for
68 See inter alia Halford v The United Kingdom [1997] ECHR 32, Copland v The United Kingdom [2007] ECHR
253, Antović and Mirković v Montenegro {2017] ECHR 1068, Barbulescu v Romania [2017] ECHR 742. ibid.
69 Tyrer v The United Kingdom [1978] ECHR 2
70 CoE, ‘Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the ECHR’ (2012), Human Rights 
Handbook, p9.
71 Antović & Mirković v Montenegro [2017] ECHR 365
72 See DPA 1998, s 29(1)(a) and the first data protection principle in DPA 1998, s 4 and Sched 1, Part 1 and 
Sched 2.
73 DPA 1998, s 36; see now GDPR, art 2(2)(d). See on the scope of the domestic purposes exemption in relation 
to CCTV, the CJEU case of Rynes v Urad, Case C-212/13, 11 December 2014.
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private or public operators, and no specific licensing regime, and indeed, it was perhaps for
this  very  reason  that  the  UK  has  become  renowned  as  a  CCTV  surveillance  hotspot.74
However the other data protection principles still applied to data captured using CCTV, and
supervision was increasingly applied regarding these requirements as part of the role of the
Information  Commissioner  who  issued  guidance  both  on  CCTV75 and  on  employee
surveillance76 which intersected with the former. This regime is substantially re-implemented
by the GDPR and the DPA 2018 although it seems that the new DP Policing Directive77 as
implemented in Pt3 of DPA2018 applies only to “competent” (ie public) “authorities” and not
to private householders or workplaces78. This leaves private domestic use of CCTV - and use
by workplaces to detect or prevent crime - in the odd position of being exempted from the
GDPR but not covered by the framework of the Policing Directive. CCTV is now specifically
regulated in England and Wales by a Surveillance Camera Commissioner which operates a
Surveillance Cameras Code of Practice79 but this Code and oversight only applies to public
places, not workplaces.80
In the workplace therefore, CCTV surveillance could frequently be justified by a claim that it
was there to prevent or detect crime, with only notice to employers needed. This need for
notice,  combined  with  the  accumulating  influence  of  the  ECHR Article  8  case  law (see
above)  and its  influence  on employment  appeal  tribunals,  led  to  a  general  good practice
assumption that a policy regarding employee surveillance and monitoring was required. This
practice  was  reinforced  by  the  Lawful  Business  Regulations  which,  as  noted  above,
essentially also made employer interception of employee calls and e-mails lawful so long as
clear notice was given; and by the guidance offered by the ICO which strengthened the idea
that CCTV was legal if implemented with regard for the reasonable expectations of privacy
of employees (see below) and with use of an acceptable use or monitoring policy of some
74 See the famous claim from 2004 that the average Briton was caught on camera 300 times a day. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/how-average-briton-is-caught-on-camera-300-times-a-day-
5354728.html .
75 See now ICO In the picture: A data protection code of practice for surveillance cameras and personal 
information v 1.2 as of 2017 at https://ico.org.uk/media/1542/cctv-code-of-practice.pdf .
76 See now ICO The Employment Practices Code at https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1064/the_employment_practices_code.pdf .
77 Directive 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences of the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.
78 Ibid, art 2(1) and 3(7). See also DPA 2018, part III.
79 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/surveillance-camera-code-of-practice, June 2013. The SCC 
was installed by the authority of s 30 (1) (a) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Scotland has its own 
scheme: 
80 See Surveillance Camera Code of Practice, supra, 1.1 and 1.9.
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kind.81 
Our case study is not, however, about detection or prevention of crime. Nor does it relate
solely to domestic processing. Assuming this was admitted, university employers might turn
to a number of other grounds for lawful processing given that lecture capture clearly does
involve processing of personal data82 and thus falls within the scope of the DP regime (see the
very  wide  definition  in  Article  4(2)  which  includes  inter  alia collection,  recording,
consultation and use of data). Personal data captured includes the voice and image of the
presenter which might also indicate qualities of, inter alia, racial or ethnic origin – a category
of special category data (Article 9).83 Less obviously, the content of the lecture, if it “relates
to”  the  speaker  and  makes  them  identified  or  identifiable  (Article  4(1))  is  also  almost
certainly regarded as personal data, and might again be special category if it relates to one of
the  categories  listed  in  Article  9.  In  Nowak,84 the  CJEU  held  that  text  written  by  an
anonymous candidate  in an exam was personal data “relating to” the candidate.  It seems
likely  the  same arguments  would apply  to  lecture  videos,  and such videos,  unlike  exam
answers, are almost impossible to anonymise because of the nature of video recording and
lecture use.85 
So is the processing involved in lecture capture lawful (Article 6, GDPR)? If a university is
not seen as a public body – which is a conflicted question nowadays, at least in the UK 86 –
the  ground of  legitimate  interests  (Article  6(1)(f)  might  be  available.  If  it  was,  then  the
ground that the processing was carried out for the performance of a task in the public interest
(Article  6(1)(e))  might  be  appropriate.  It  could  also  be  argued  that  lecture  capture  was
necessary for performance of the employment contract the lecturer had signed (Article 6(1)
(b)). In both these last two cases, the use of the word “necessary”, which is in post GDPR
practice becoming  a steadily more stringent requirement, makes the ground questionable: the
81 See ICO supra n 75 at 3.3.2; note also Smith v Trafford Housing Trust [2013] IRLR 86.
82 We refer here only to the personal data of the employee. Lecture capture may of course involve processing of 
personal data of the students involved. This is however outwith this paper.
83 Although note GDPR, recital 51 which appears to indicate that racial indications drawn from video or pictorial
material may not be treated as special category data unless processed intentionally to uniquely identify someone 
(ie as biometric data).
84 Nowak v DPC, CJEU, C:2017:994, 20 December 2017.
85 Presumably the face of the lecturer could be blurred and the voice distorted by available technologies. 
However this seems highly unlikely to be done and in any case the lecturer could probably be identified in most 
university departments by reference to timetables, websites, e-mail contact addresses etc. Note also that in 
Nowak even though the candidate’s name was anonymised to the marker, the court held the data was still 
personal because it could be easily reidentified by the exam authorities.
86 See disparities in legislation in the UK relating to the status of universities for tax, FOI, as a “competent 
authority” for DP law etc. Public authorities are not allowed to make use of the legitimate interests ground – 
GDPR, art 6(f).
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video capture might be regarded simply as desirable not essential to the job. Much might
depend perhaps on the nature of the institution, its business model or charter, and the course
or  programme  where  lecture  capture  took  place  (a  distance  learning  programme  would
obviously be very different from one habitually taught in small face to face groups. A large
class,  where  recourse  to  captured  lectures  to  replace  access  to  live  teaching  was
commonplace but not essential might fall in the middle.)  Finally of course, video capture
might be legitimised by consent (Article 6(1)(a))
In practice it has probably been regarded as normal to seek consent for lecture capture and
this  might  be  done  by  acceptance  of  an  overall  policy  or  perhaps  by  a  release  signed
separately  at  the start  of  the course  or  each lecture.  It  was  expected  by the  authors  that
consent of some kind would be a norm because of awareness that copyright  permissions
would also need to be taken and recorded,87 something universities should be very aware of,
not just because of the rights of the lecturer themselves but because of the possibility of legal
risk  if  eg  copyright  materials  by  third  parties  were  incorporated  into  lectures  and
used/distributed to students via videos. However as noted above, collection of consent for DP
purposes is not at all necessary given other lawful grounds, and in fact the newly updated
JISC guidelines on lecture capture88 still do not require or even state a preference for explicit
(or even non explicit) consent to recordings in relation to data protection issues. In our policy
survey,  as  noted above,  only 28 out  of 40 universities  implementing  lecture capture  had
policies. It is harder of course to know how many institutions sought discrete permissions or
releases for classes or individual lectures, and no survey respondents reported this occurring.
However a number of general points can be made. 
First from the policy survey, a large minority of universities (15 out of the 40 using lecture
capture) impose lecture capture as “opt out” ie consent presumed unless objection made. This
standard of consent may be doubted as adequate, especially given the model of the newly
reformed GDPR where consent must be “freely given , specific, informed and unambiguous”
(Article 4(11)) and signified by a clear affirmative act and not merely by passive lack of
resistance  as  with  pre-ticked  boxes  or  in  the  employment  case,  non-negotiable  clauses.89
Furthermore, in the GDPR, consent must be “freely given” and again, it now seems clear in
the employment domain, given the inherent power imbalance, that consent can no longer act
87 It is not possible in this paper to address copyright as well as privacy issues – a copyright release might not be 
necessary in an employment scenario but the issue is complex - but see the JISC guidelines as updated 19 June 
2018, supra n36 for a good summary.
88 Supra n 36.
89 GDPR, art 4(11) and recital 32.
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as a lawful basis to legitimise the processing of employee data.90 Thirdly, in our case study
we posit that videos made as part of lecture capture schemes might then be repurposed for
strike-breaking or employee surveillance as performance assessment. In such a case in DP
law the consent would not do to justify the new purpose of processing unless this was made
clear and a new consent sought; or another ground of lawful processing used to justify the
new processing. A blanket consent to unnamed purposes – such as a general release which
might have been expected to cover copyright and anything else - would be insufficiently
specific (Article 4(11)). A consent to “educational use” might be more dubious. We would
argue that it  could not be reasonably expected that  educational  use would include use to
replace lecturers while they were on strike and as a restriction on a fundamental right, the use
of consent should be interpreted narrowly.
Even if an adequate consent is obtained, or one of the other Article 6 grounds made out, a
problem may arise  if  the  lecture  contains  special  category data.  The grounds for  lawful
processing in Article 9 are much more limited than in Article 6 and in practice,  the only
applicable ground may be explicit consent (Article 9(2)(a)). This led one of the authors to
recommend  informally  that  to  take  control  over  use (or  re-use)  of  lectures  captured,  the
speaker should periodically include items of special category data in the lecture, eg, their
trade  union membership  or  religious  or  political  or  sexual  opinions.  This  may  not  be  a
practical  suggestion  in  every  case  however,  and  lecture  footage  can  of  course  be  edited
(although this might itself raise issues concerning copyright, if retained by the lecturer, and
the moral right to integrity).
In general therefore, it might be concluded that DP is not likely to render lecture capture,
even without consent, unlawful in principle at least in the ordinary conditions of educational
use. Repurposing of lecture capture footage for strike breaking (or performance surveillance)
without any new consent  being sought,  might  however well  be unlawful,  if  based on an
original consent to recording for educational purposes (say), or on one of the Article 6 non-
consent grounds. Anecdotally, a number of universities do seem to have assumed they could
rely on existing consents during the lecturers’ strike. Much might depend on the exact nature
of the wording, remembering that the GDPR firmly requires consent to be “specific” and
“informed”. The lack of an explicit policy or an explicit new consent might be fatal to both of
these.
As indicated above, in any case DP is not the end of the story here. The ECtHR has also had a
90 Ibid and see also recital 43 and A29WP documents cited at n  50 supra.
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decisive role in ascertaining if workplace surveillance is legal with regard to Article 8 of the
ECHR. Two questions are raised here: first, is Article 8 engaged – that is, is there a breach of
the right to respect for private life? Second, are there reasons justifying this incursion under
Article 8(2)? 
ECHR: Engagement with Article 8(1)
On the first point, an amalgamation of factors affect the court’s determination as to whether
employee privacy has been breached under Article 8(1) including inter alia the nature of the
monitoring technology, the nature of activity under surveillance, and the recording, storing,
processing and use of data obtained are considered.  In the case of video surveillance the
situation may vary depending on whether or not a policy gave adequate notice to employees
of the nature and purposes of video surveillance; and whether there was or was not consent to
video surveillance. A key formulation which has emerged is the reasonable expectations of
the employee. 
Notice and policies
In the early cases of Halford v UK91 and Copland v UK92 lack of notice of surveillance was a
key factor in the Courts’ determinations that employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy
at work had been infringed. These cases were driving forces in the general move towards
policies around surveillance in workplaces. 
Turning to our case study, our policy survey shows that in the majority of circumstances
pertaining to the operation of lecture capture technology, workplace policies are in place and
it is likely that awareness will thus influence whether privacy rights have been breached.93
However, only 28 out of 40 institutions involved in lecture capture had policies that could
either be identified from the Internet or were supplied by staff in response to the survey. This
is surprisingly low and often there seemed to be some confusion if a policy existed, whether
it was finalised or still in development or reform, and perhaps which employees it covered.
Even if a policy exists, the Courts have held that employees maintain a non-zero expectation
of  privacy  despite  notification  of  surveillance.  The  Grand  Chamber  in  Barbulescu  v
Romania94 held that despite awareness of internal regulations and monitoring policies, “an
91  Halford v UK [1997] ECHR 32
92 Copland v The United Kingdom [2007] ECHR 253
93 The Court in López & Ors v Spain(Application No 1874/13).held that reasonable expectations of privacy are 
reinforced when employers fail to comply with legal obligations requiring employees to be adequately informed 
of surveillance. López at 67 
94 Barbulescu v Romania [2017] ECHR 754
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employer’s instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero”.95 
The most relevant case to our case study is the recent decision in  Antović and Mirkovic v
Montenegro,96 in which private life was found to be breached when university lecturers were
video recorded, without giving their  consent, during teaching in auditoria.  The recordings
were used to assess lecturer performance by their Dean, not to benefit students in any direct
way. The University of Montenegro took the view they were entitled to do this under a local
statute and that these lecture halls were public places and so the consent of lecturers or other
justification was never even considered. University lecturers were, however, informed of the
introduction and operation of video recording technology in university auditoria, Thus there
was notice but not consent. 
The Strasbourg court by contrast took the view that these auditoria were the workplaces of
academics,  where  ‘lecturers  meet  and  interact  with  students  whilst  developing  their
personality  and  relations’.97 Although  notice  had  been  given,  the  Chamber  held  that  a
reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  remained.  However,  the  decision  that  Article  8  was
engaged was on a fine margin (4 votes to 3) with the dissenting judges noting that “having
been notified, their (lecturers) reasonable expectation of privacy in that context,  if any, was
very limited”.98 (Interestingly, there appears to be a disconnect with the approach taken to
interception of communications at work under domestic UK law here. As noted above, the
Lawful Business Regulations 2018 suggest that no expectation of privacy will remain once
the employer has made “reasonable efforts to inform (of surveillance)”.99 
Consent
Consent to lecture capture policies can also affect whether Article 8 is engaged. We have
already discussed consent in the DP section above.
The ECtHR is of course not required to be co-equivalent with the GDPR and the rulings of
the CJEU on the definition of consent.100 But it seems likely that the points discussed above
concerning the inadequacies of consent in a workplace might also serve to negate the effect
of  any  “consent”  collected  on  reducing  the  reasonable  expectations  of  privacy  of  the
95 Ibid at 80
96 Supra n 8 . 
97 Antović at 44
98 Antović – Dissenting Opinion at 12
99  The Investigatory Powers (Interception by Businesses etc. for Monitoring and Record-keeping Purposes) 
Regulations 2018, No. 356, s4(c)
100 See eg the fracas over the case of Delfi v Estonia (2015) ECtHR 64669/09 in relation to intermediary liability,
where the ECtHR diverged substantially from the rules in the EU E-Commerce Directive. However subsequent 
cases in the Strasbourg court did appear to try to remedy this rift.
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employee.  In  Barbulescu,  the  employee  was  alleged  to  have  provided  consent  to  the
monitoring  of  his  communications  and this  lowered any expectation  of  privacy at  work.
However, the court doubted the validity of consent to surveillance, as the notification was
neither sufficiently clear nor given in advance.101 Consequently, the employee was found to
have some expectations of privacy at work. In Antovic, it was explicitly noted that workplace
video  surveillance  “entails  the  recorded  and  reproducible  documentation  of  a  person’s
conduct at his or her workplace, which the employee, being obliged under the employment
contract to perform the work in that place, cannot evade”.102 This seems a clear reference to
the impoverished nature of any consent given as part of an employment contract as well as, in
that case, the actual absence of consent. 
Finally  the  ECtHR  has  made  it  clear  both  in  Antovic and  Kopke103 that  covert  video
surveillance  is  “a  considerable  intrusion  into  the  employee’s  private  life”.  There  is  an
interesting question to be asked here: is lecture capture imposed consensually for one purpose
(widening access  or lecture  review) and then re-used for other  purposes (strike-breaking,
performance  assessment)  substantially  equivalent  to  unexpected  or  covert  surveillance?104
Certainly although this precise scenario (repurposing) has not yet come to Strasbourg, the
case  law  seems  to  indicate  the  court  would  not  look  favourably  on  this  in  terms  of
engagement of Article 8(1). 
Function and nature of surveillance
Regardless of the existence of a lecture  capture policy and consent  to it,  the employee’s
fundamental  right  to  privacy  may  still  be  engaged.  The  nature  of  the  activity  under
surveillance can also affect privacy expectations. Judge Vucini and Lemmens concurred with
the  majority  opinion  in  Antović but  believed  that  the  Court  failed  to  attach  adequate
importance to the nature of the activity that was placed under surveillance.105 The concurring
judges noted that as teaching and learning activities in universities are covered by ‘academic
freedom’,  privacy  expectations  of  not  being  placed  under  video  surveillance  should  be
regarded as reasonable.106 
101 Barbulescu at 77
102 Antović at 44
103 Köpke v. Germany (dec.), no. 420/07, 5 October 2010
104 This phrase has a technical meaning in UK surveillance law but, though used in much ECtHR case law, does 
not seem to have a formal definition.
105 Antović – Concurring Opinions at 2 
106 Antović – Concurring Opinions at 4 
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Fascinatingly, the  Antovic case is the inverse of the case study we present. In  Antovic, the
recordings were explicitly used for performance assessment (and allegedly to monitor and
prevent thefts from lecture halls, but this was doubted by the court because the locks on the
halls were sufficient for that purpose). They were not used for giving access to lectures to
students. In our case study, lecture capture is almost exclusively initiated for purposes to
benefit students, but is then repurposed for strike breaking or performance assessment. The
first dissenting judgment in Antovic noted that:
“It seems to us that in such an interaction the teacher may have an expectation of
privacy, in the sense that he or she may normally expect that what is going on in the
classroom can be followed only by those who are entitled to attend the class and who
actually attend it. No “unwanted attention” from others, who have nothing to do with
the  class.  There  may  be  exceptions,  for  instance  when  a  lecture  is  taped  for
educational purposes, including for use by students who were unable to physically
attend the class. However, in the applicants’ case there was no such purpose.”
This seems to imply that it may not be a breach of Article 8(1) to record lectures where the
purpose  is to  benefit  students,  even without  consent.  The second dissenting  judgment  in
Antovic indeed took a strong line that video recording in the circumstances of the case, ie,
with notice, as part of professional employment, and with limitations to the surveillance such
as remote activation, reduced identifiability, access only by one person (the Dean), deletion
of the recording after 30 days, and no subsequent use or re-use, was not a breach of Article
8(1)  at  all.107 The  dissenting  judges  (Judges  Spano,  Bianku  and  Kjølbro)  criticised  the
majority reasoning, noting that the “mere fact of the amphitheatres being monitored cannot in
our view engage Article 8(1) without further elements being demonstrated”.108 However it
still seems likely that a change of purpose after such recordings are made, without consent or
notice,  will  breach  reasonable  expectations,  and  notwithstanding  the  second  dissenting
opinion, the expectations of academic freedom of lecturers are especially significant here.
The subsequent  use  of  recorded  lectures  will  be  a  crucial  factor  in  determining  whether
employee privacy is infringed.109
Following the usual reasoning of the Courts in other employee surveillance decisions, the
whole circumstances of lecture capture must thus be considered when determining if Article
8  is  engaged.  Differing  outcomes  will  result,  depending  on  whether  inter  alia audio
107 Antović – Dissenting Opinion at 10 
108 Antović – Dissenting Opinion at 12 
109 Antović – See Dissenting Opinion at 10 and Concurring Opinion at 4
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recordings accompany video surveillance, the quality of the lecture capture technology, any
attempts at blurring or redaction, and the duration of storage and accessibility of recordings.
Thus,  universities  have scope to distinguish  their  use of  lecture  capture technology from
circumstances which are considered infringing. Nevertheless, the subsequent use of recorded
lectures for purposes not originally intended or envisaged – such as strike breaking - is likely
to be sufficient to infringe employees’ Article 8 rights. 
ECHR: Is the interference legal under Article 8(2)? 
Assuming that the operation of lecture capture technology in the workplace engages Article
8,  the  Court  will  consider  whether  the  alleged  interference  is  legally  justified  under  the
conditions  of  Article  8(2).  The  Court  will  determine  whether  the  interference  is  “in
accordance with law”, falls within the exhaustive list of ‘legitimate purposes’ under Article
8(2), and whether the interference is restricted to what is “necessary in a democratic society”.
“In accordance with law” 
Firstly, the interference with employee privacy must be in accordance with domestic law. The
Court in Copland reiterates the requirement of ‘in accordance with law’:
 “not only requires compliance with domestic law, but also relates to the quality of
that law, requiring it  to be compatible  with the rule of law. In order to fulfil  the
requirement of foreseeability, the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give
individuals  an  adequate  indication  as  to  the  circumstances  in  which  and  the
conditions  on  which  the  authorities  are  empowered  to  resort  to  any  such
measures”.110 
The first hurdle of legality will be overcome if there exists a “measure of legal protection in
domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded
by Article  8(1)”.111 National  legislation,  common law,  and other  ‘soft  law’ measures can
satisfy the legality requirement so long as it is sufficiently detailed, clear and precise. The law
must be foreseeable and accessible,  providing individuals  with adequate indication of the
circumstances in which surveillance at work and dissemination of recorded lectures will take
place.
In Halford and Copland, the Court held that the employees’ Article 8 right was violated due
to lack of domestic regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, an organisational framework and
110 Copland at 45 and 46 
111 Copland at 45 
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general mandate to engage in employee surveillance will not satisfy the condition of legality.
In Copland, the ECtHR held that despite the university’s statutory purpose to “do anything
necessary of expedient for purposes of providing higher education or further education”,112
this broad general mandate was incompatible with the rule of law. Nowadays, surveillance at
work can fulfil the condition of legality as an array of legal sources provide protection against
arbitrary interference with employees’ Article 8 rights. For instance, as already noted, the
Lawful Business Regulations, data protection regimes, ICO codes of conduct and guidance
on  surveillance  at  work.113 The  Court  would  analyse  whether  the  aforementioned  legal
regimes  fulfil  the  requirements  of  the  rule  of  law,  in  particular,  whether  secondary
unanticipated use of recorded lectures is foreseeable. 
If  the  interference  with  employee  privacy  fails  to  comply  with  established  legal
frameworks and principles, the interference will not be regarded as in accordance with law. In
Antović, the majority held that the interference with privacy was not in accordance with law
as the university had breached the local data protection statute. In particular, the purpose of
video recording of lecturers for the ‘surveillance of teaching’ was “not provided for by law as
a ground for video surveillance”.114 The use of recorded lectures in unanticipated ways (i.e for
‘strike breaking’) may, as we have introduced above, constitute a breach of data protection’s
‘purpose  limitation’  principle  and  obligations  of  transparency,115 thus  failing  to  be  “in
accordance with law”. 
“Legitimate purpose” 
The Court will consider whether the interference with the employee privacy falls within the
exhaustive and broadly construed ‘legitimate purposes’ outline under Article 8(2).116 In cases
concerning employee surveillance,  it  is usually accepted that surveillance is legitimate for
several purposes but in particular to ‘protect the rights and freedoms of others’. Employers’
rights in protecting their  property and safeguarding the rights of students are regarded as
legitimate  aims  which  may  justify  surveillance.  In  Antović, the  video  recording  of
amphitheatres  was  accepted  for  the  purposes  of  ‘ensuring  the  safety  of  property  and
protecting students rights’ but not for the ‘surveillance of teaching’.117
112 Copland at 47 
113 Supra pp 15ff.
114 Antović at 59 
115 For example, see López , supra n 92.
116 Beatson, J. et al., ‘Human Rights: Judicial Protection in the United Kingdom’ (Sweet and Maxwell: London,
2008), 162 
117 Antović at 59
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“Necessary in a democratic society” 
Finally,  the interference with employee privacy must be no more than is “necessary in a
democratic society”. The Court will undertake a test of proportionality in order to determine
whether the State allows for the achievement of legitimate purposes without disproportionate
impact on the fundamental right to privacy. Powers allowing for surveillance of employees
and subsequent  use of  data  must  not  be excessive  and have adequate  guarantees  against
abuse.118 However, States’ ‘margin of appreciation’ in assessing the extent of necessity of
interference  with  employee  privacy is  wide  due to  the  nature  of  employment,  the  broad
discretionary powers of employers inherent in contractual relations and the lack of European
consensus on the issue.119 That  said,  national  discretion  on the matter  is  not  unlimited.120
Interference with employee privacy must be justified by a ‘pressing social need’ relating to
the legitimate aim identified.121 The Court will also assess whether domestic law allowing for
the interference with employee privacy is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  The
Court will consider whether domestic authorities have struck an appropriate balance between
university, students and employees rights. However, the ECtHR have held that employers
have a legitimate interest in “ensuring the smooth running of the company” and that extensive
weight be afforded to how the employer wishes to achieve this aim.122 Institutions may claim
that decisions to reuse recorded lectures forms part of their broad discretionary powers to
ensure the smooth running of University business. 
It is worth noting however that within EU jurisprudence, the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights  also  offers  in  Article  16  the  “freedom to  conduct  a  business”  and this  has  been
regarded as an influential freedom when balanced against the fundamental and legal rights of
others in a number of significant CJEU Internet law cases eg Scarlet v SABAM123 (Article 16
right  of  ISP  balanced  against  intellectual  property  rights  of  copyright  collecting  society
demanding filtering or pirate works) or McFadden v Sony124 (Article 16 right of ISP balanced
against  IP rights  of  rights  holder).  However  it  is  rare  to  non-existent  to  see breaches  of
privacy justified by the business model of a company under Article 16 and indeed, it has also
been held in the Strasbourg court, that a fundamental freedom cannot be defined so as to
118 Silver v. United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347
119 Barbulescu at 117 -119
120 Silver at 97
121 Leander v. Sweden [1987] 9 EHRR 433 at 58.
122 Barbulescu at 127. 
123 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:771.
124 Case C-484/14, 15 September 2016.
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justify breaking the law, in this case, DP law which already incorporates into its regime a
balance between fundamental  rights of privacy and rights such as freedom of expression,
freedom to conduct a business et al.125
UK employment law: an alternative approach
Cases concerning employee surveillance and violation of privacy before the UK tribunals and
courts are principally advanced on the basis of unfair dismissal law. Although employees
might argue that Article 8 has been breached and thus dismissal unfair,126 their complaint
against  the  employer  is  usually  founded  upon  a  breach  of  the  mutual  duty  of  trust  and
confidence. Nevertheless, Article 8 has been invoked by employees in domestic courts and
tribunals  in  attempts  to  exclude  evidence  obtained  through  surveillance  with  varying
success.127 When Article 8 is considered to be engaged, outcomes regularly turn on whether
the breach is regarded as proportionate.128 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider
whether the mutual duty of trust and confidence can be invoked to challenge the legality of
lecture capture. Nevertheless, trust and confidence has become a source of privacy protection
at  work  due  to  inter  alia Strasbourg’s  Article  8  jurisprudence,  the  incorporation  of  the
Convention into domestic law,129 and the corresponding interpretative obligations of domestic
Courts to take into account judgments, declarations and advisory opinions of the ECtHR.130
The mutual duty of trust and confidence has developed with potential to provide a remedy to
the unanticipated use of recorded lectures for the purposes of strike breaking and also actively
regulate the use of lecture capture technology in the workplace. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have taken a “natural accident” case study to examine what happens and how
the law responds when one type of video surveillance – lecture capture – is  suddenly in
adverse circumstances repurpose in a way inimical to the data subject. We have also taken
into account the less mainstreamed but also threatening trend towards repurposing lecture
125 See most notably arts 6(1)(f) and art 17(3)(a) of the GDPR.  The ECtHR has held that a fundamental freedom
cannot be framed to justify breaking the law : see  Vukota-Bojić v. Switzerland [2016] no. 61838/10 and 
Trabajo Rueda v. Spain [2017] no. 32600/12, also the dissenting judgment by Dedov in the employee 
surveillance case of  López Ribalda & Ors v Spain [2018] (Application No. 1874/13).
126 See City of Swansea v Gayle [2013] IRLR 768, McGowan v. Scottish Water [2005] IRLR 167, Turner v East 
Midland s Trains Ltd [2102] IRLR 107, Crisp v Apple Retail (UK) Ltd ET/1500258/11
127 See Jones v University of Warwick [2003] EWCA Civ 151 and Chairman and Govenors of Amwell View 
School v Dogherty [2007] IRLR 198, in which surveillance of the employer by the employee was regarded as 
obtained in breach of privacy and thus to be excluded from the courts considerations.
128 See McCann v Clude College UKEATS/0061/09/BI and the ET and EAT reasoning in City of Swansea v 
Gayle [2013] IRLR 768
129 Human Rights Act 1998, Chpt. 42 n
130 HRA, s2
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capture  systems as  performance  assessment  of  academic  staff  without  their  consent.  We
found that, leaving aside national labour laws for further examination, there are two main
legal routes towards asserting control of lecture capture material: data protection and Article
8 privacy rights. Data protection is unlikely to offer a clear route to banning repurposing of
lecture videos without consent. Consent is only one ground for lawful processing and others
may be seen as more permissive.  However employers may run into difficulties if  special
category data is used in lectures or revealed about the lecturer and which cannot be redacted. 
Article 8 is also a conflicted and dubious space in relation to workplace surveillance. The
recent case of Antovic, which itself did involve the use of lecture capture without consent as
performance  assessment,  and  did  not involve  a  student  “widening  access”  educational
element, seems an obvious case where the privacy argument should have won hands down.
Yet in fact the court only decided by a bare majority that a breach of Article 8 had occurred,
in the teeth of a strong dissenting opinion. This in itself shows both the lack of European
consensus on privacy rights in the workplace, themselves only acknowledged since the 90s,
and the still strong feeling that the workplace is very different from other private and public
spaces where individual autonomy rights are strong and the economic and business reasons to
surveille do not come into opposition.
In our case study, some specific issues come into play which do not apply to all workplace
scenarios. Are academics in some way special because of their alleged rights to freedom of
expression, especially in their teaching? Is the relationship between lecturer and student of
close and critical,  perhaps  even edgy,  engagement,  one that  might  suffer  from mandated
surveillance,  especially  for  future  assessment  in  a  time  of  increasing  regard  for  student
satisfaction  surveys,  worries  about  political  correctness  and  disciplinarian  academic
management styles? Might re-use or abuse, of lecture capture lead to a reluctance to engage
with it in “normal” times, which would rebound on students and especially on those most
vulnerable and in need of help such as students unable to physically get to campus due to
illness or special needs?. We would argue yes to all of these. The trust of academics in their
management in the UK was deeply wounded by the UCU strike in general, and was damaged
further by the narrative, whether true, prevalent or over-hyped, that recorded lectures might
be used as strike-breaking material  against  their  will.  The trust  of students might also be
damaged if they felt they were being fobbed off with a second rate replacement for lectures
during  periods  of  dispute;  or  were being  asked to  be  complicit  in  strike-breaking action
against their teachers, when many student organisations had expressed sympathy for the USS
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strike. 
Some of the policies canvassed in our survey had positive approaches to such scenarios. For
instance,  Cardiff  University  asserted  that  “these  lectures  are  taped  to  support  student
learning” and stated that any other use had to be discussed and agreed to. Cardiff, Brunel,
Kings College London, Liverpool, Manchester, Queen Mary London and Sheffield explicitly
stated in their policies that they did not use recordings for performance management.  We
recommend this formulation. We also recommend that the use of recorded lectures to replace
“live” lectures during industrial action should be regarded as unethical and an impermissible
breach  of  trust.  During  the  UCU strike  it  was  regarded  as  heartening  that  a  number  of
universities saw this point and retrenched from stated positions of re-use of lectures. Finally
we recommend – though this may be seen as unduly radical in its restriction of business
freedom – that  universities  should not implement  lecture  capture policies  at  all,  even for
wholly  beneficial  motives,  without  obtaining  the  specific  and  informed  consent  of  the
lecturers whose personal data is captured and processed. 
Finally themes can be drawn from our case study which have wider significance for the world
outside academe. Increasingly surveillance technologies come onto the market which may be
marketed as beneficial in some way without, deliberately or not, sufficient attention being
paid to potential illegal, unethical or harmful uses. A good example is “Social Mapper”: a
product  marketed  ostensibly  to  discover  vulnerabilities  in  an  organisation’s  security.  In
essence, Social Mapper takes as input the names and images of workers at a company and
then goes out to “correlate social media profiles across a number of different sites on a large
scale” ie look on the Internet, at Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, Twitter et al, to find where
employees hang out and what they say and do. As the Register put it:
“In other words: even though your LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook, Google+ (because
we've all got one of those), Instagram, Russian VK, and Chinese Weibo profiles are
all under different names and handles, Social Mapper can link all those profiles to you
by matching a  photo of your face to the selfies  you used on each of the account
pages.”131
This  product  is  marketed  as  a  legitimate  security  service  because  these  employees
discoverable on social media can then be seen as weak links in the overall infosec of the
company, susceptible to social engineering – a kind of “penetration testing”. But it also seems
131 See “Need a facial recognition auto-doxxx tool? Social Mapper has you covered”, Register, 10 August 2018 
at https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/08/10/spiderlabs_social_mapper/ .
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plain that this may also enable covert and ubiquitous employee surveillance,  at work and
outside. Should such repurposed tools be legal? Are they? If so, are they ethical? With such
technologies  flooding  the  markets,  not  just  for  employees  but  also  for  parents  tracking
children, disgruntled ex-partners, and others, we hope our case study may indicate some of
the legal dimensions of repurposed surveillance, with a view to kickstarting a debate which
should then move beyond law perhaps to commercial and professional ethics as well as to
privacy by design.132
Another  recent  phenomenon  we  have  observed  has  been  the  rise  of  technology-aided
“wellness” programmes in offices – where employers offer, demand or link to benefits, a
variety of screenings for eg fitness, weight loss, or chronic disease. Some of these involve
IoT surveillance ; eg FitBits to measure and encourage employee “wellness”. Gilroy-Scott, a
lawyer in this area, estimates that “around 202 million wearable devices were given out by
employers  in  2016” as  part  of  corporate  wellness  programmes”  and warns  that  although
employees and employers are both often positive about such schemes – the latter especially
seeing it as a way to cut absenteeism costs – they also involve the collection of huge amounts
of evidence about  “location,  hours worked, rest  breaks and even activity  levels”.133 Lyon
discusses  employee  use  of  such  wearables  as  just  one  of  many  examples  of  items  that
contribute to the normalisation of surveillance.134 As with our case study, workers may be
keen to enable such technological surveillance initially but should be prepared for when it is
repurposed  to  achieve  less  expected  and  less  desirable  goals  such  as  demotion  and
replacement.135
The road to surveillance may be paved with good intentions – but it may still be taking us
somewhere that as a society we really don’t want to go.
132 There is a growing field of work around the idea of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) where 
innovators are asked to consider the possible ethical pitfalls or creating or putting into circulation their new 
technologies- it is beyond the scope of this paper to canvass these but we would like to include it in further 
work, as well as considering “privacy by design” in the creation of legitimate surveillance tools (see GDPR art 
25).
133 Gilroy-Scott, C. “Wearable fitness trackers in the workplace: surveillance by fitbit?, Personnel Today, 26 
April 2017 at https://www.personneltoday.com/hr/wearable-fitness-trackers-workplace-surveillance-fitbit/ 
134 Lyon, D. 'The Culture of Surveillance: Watching as a Way of Life' (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018) ch 3
135 Interestingly, a recent empirical study showed no causal link between such schemes and improvements in 
employee health or productivity or the medical spend of employers. See Carroll, A. “Why Workplace Wellness 
Programs Don’t Work Well. Why Some Studies Show Otherwise.” New York Times, 6 August 2018.
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